Cities and Resources

August 24th, 2010 - Arthur (Andy) Felts

Another breakout track at the July Hazards Conference in Boulder focused on Environmental Change and Patterns of Vulnerability. I wrote a bit about that in my first blog on the meeting.

In that blog I mentioned that Dr. Peter Wenger from NSF participated on the panel and talked about Dr. Peter Berke was researching the “new urbanism” and its impact on community resilience.

The panel, “The Maddening of Crowding: Urban Vulnerability,” was interesting in and of itself. It focused mostly on what were called “megacities,” those with 19 million plus residents. Wenger talked about the most vulnerable being “SINs”—Small Island Nations and the need for a global platform to look at vulnerability. He also referred to cities as having large “concentrations of resources.”

Dr. William Siembieda from California Polytechnic Institute—San Luis Obispo, echoed that comment. Only he also pointed out that these cities contain large poor populations and both the need to increase income for these as well as form international “insurance pools” where they can ensure the leverage of these resources.

All of this echoed for me Lawrence J. Vale and Thomas J. Campella’s edited volume, The resilient city: How modern cities recover from disaster (Oxford University Press, 2005). I highly recommend the book. Various authors in that book talk about how major cities are located in important places and there was a commitment to building them in the first place. That suggests that we don’t need to look exclusively at megacities, we could include a whole lot more on the list. New York City of course, Los Angeles, Houston, Chicago, Atlanta and Charlotte all have a lot of resources at their disposal.

This predisposes (pun intended) most all big cities to be more resilient. While researching for a paper I’m just finishing up, I was quite surprised to discover that Hiroshima’s population returned to pre-atomic bomb levels by 1955. Undoubtedly, this is a good example of resilience, acknowledging that Japan is a small nation and enjoys cultural homogeneity.

The resilient city is an excellent read. It recounts, among other things, how Berlin was rebuilt after WWII, San Francisco recovered from the 1906 combined fire and earthquake, and Washington, DC after it was nearly destroyed by the British Invasion of 1814.

In all these cases, and many more, there was a huge will among the cities leadership (public and private) to restore and recover. In fact, Vale suggests it is an axiom of resilience that it is a test of the very legitimacy of those leaders. They have to inspire people and leverage resources to go on.

It was the fact that these cities had large numbers of differently skilled leaders that were able to leverage the resources they possessed.

“Large” is a relative number—what was large in 1500 AD might be small now—but I’d opine that in today’s world, most cities with 5 million or more residents possess that inherent resiliency that comes from making themselves unique and creating a sense of place and capitalizing on their economic engines. There are exceptions, of course. Pompeii was in no position to recover after Mount Vesuvius erupted.

It may come down to simply a large population, poor or otherwise that points to their inherent resilience. I’d say not. One of my favorite quotes from Charleston’s Mayor Joseph P. Riley, Jr. is that city “places”—parks, promenades, cultural venues, sports arenas, boulevards—are places where “memories are made.” People seek to preserve those.

Comments (0)

Resilience – additional feedback from the July 2010 Annual Hazards Workshop

August 13th, 2010 - Arthur (Andy) Felts

In my last blog, I commented on the Hazards Workshop in July. There is more news. One of the highlighted track plenary sessions —“Resilience—What’s That?”— featured our own Dr. Tom Wilbanks. It was moderated by, as Tom designated her, “the legendary” Clare Rubin. Clare has been doing recovery studies for longer than anyone I know. Dr. Michael Dunaway from DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate participated as did Dr. Lori Dengler from Humbolt State University.

The panel was standing room only. The discussion was in keeping with the workshop and there were two practitioner and two more academic discussions. I should tell you here that the panelists don’t get to use PowerPoint and don’t give formal papers. They give a brief presentation and then it goes open the audience, a truly refreshing way to bring academics and practitioners together for discussion.

Tom did a good job of summarizing what CARRI has been about all along, seeing mitigating, preparing and recovery from disasters as a continuous process that is interlinked. He acknowledged that defining resilience was still a work in progress.

Clare’s approach was interesting and refreshing. Though she has long been recognized for her research in disaster recovery she spoke from her position as an elected official in Virginia. In her standard straightforward fashion she said, more or less, ‘I’m not sure what resilience is, but people are beginning to talk about it and I think means I need to find out more.’

Dunaway offered some interesting comments, emphasizing resilience and the need to find funding for building our national deterrent capacity to meet the challenges we are facing. He argued we need to change our culture in the face of increasing populations and multiple threats. He saw becoming a more resilient nation as the path to accomplishing that. He concluded with a very nice quote that defined resilience to him—given to him by a private sector friend. Resilience, means finding a way to function normally in abnormal like conditions. As good start for thinking that everything is, in fact, getting back to normal (or a new normal).

A tsunami researcher, Dengler, echoed Clare’s statement and talked a bit about being in Malaysia after the huge tsunami a few years back.

One interesting thing she said was that one island tribe used the term “smong” when asked what happened. She actually found out that that meant a lot of things in one word when time was critical. Smong means “when the ground shakes and there’s a lot of things jumbled up and the sea starts to recede and you see gurgling out where the water is, head for the high ground.” So, this one tribe did just that, gathered up the kids, put grandmas in carts and trucked up about 90 meters–exactly where Dengler would have recommended they go–and they all survived. Not only did they do that, but they also had stockpiled critical materials, lumber, food, etc., up out of harm’s way as well. When was the last time a large tsunami hit the village? 1917.

Another village escaped the tsunami, but evacuated anyway. She asked the chief if they were disappointed to have gone through all the effort of getting everyone to high ground and waiting it out. He replied no, “Each time offers us a chance to practice.”

Dengler offered that she wasn’t sure, but thought those were two pretty good examples of resilience. I agree.

Comments (1)

New Urbanism and Disaster Resiliency?

July 28th, 2010 - Arthur (Andy) Felts

Attending the Annual Hazards Workshop, hosted by the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado has been a privilege I have enjoyed since coming on board with the CARRI team. The conference, unlike most, is not discipline specific, but rather brings together a group of researchers and practitioners who are interested in learning more about hazards, meaning disasters, and how we can deal with them.

July 2010 was the 35^th time the group has met. It would be an interesting exercise to plot their themes/topics over those years, but I was most pleased to see that this year there was a concurrent session on Community Resilience and Recovery. I went to several of these sessions and each was extremely well attended. CARRI’s own Tom Wilbanks was a presenter at one that had standing room only.

Though I will have more to share about what I learned at the conference, one was actually fortuitous that I learned at a panel that Dr. Philip Berke (UNC-Chapel Hill) moderated in a different track on environmental change and patterns of vulnerability. The panel focused on large-scale urban areas with that idea in mind.

One of the panel participants, Dr. Peter Wenger of the National Science Foundation revealed that Dr. Berke was engaged in NSF-funded research on what we social scientists call the “new urbanism” and disaster resiliency. From the way the questions where handled, Dr. Berke’s research is in its early stages—but from my perspective, this is terrific news for our understanding of community resilience.

The new urbanism folks address a pretty consistent theme. They don’t like urban sprawl. They don’t like single-use zoning. They think we can live and would choose to do so in denser communities where we can walk to the grocery store or work. I know more than most about this since I directed the Joseph P. Riley, Jr. Center for Urban Affairs and Mayor Riley is at the forefront of leaders in the new urbanism movement.

How does this relate to community resilience? I don’t know the details of Dr. Berke’s work for NSF, but it is pretty easy for me to see. People who live closer to where they work—to the point of walking distance—are likely to find recovery from disaster easier. Ditto for whether schools and places to shop and seek entertainment are as well.

The new urbanism movement is all about core cities and multi-purpose nodes that, in the end, create not just easy access to employment or retail, but a sense of place as well. They like small parks, places where you can go and walk, talking to your kids or playing fetch with your dog.

Berke’s is the kind of resilience research that should be pursued—it has the portent to be path-breaking in that it gets us through the multiple layers of community connections that we know entail resilience. It is encouraging to see the NSF funding such efforts. I look forward to the conclusions from this way of scientifically researching community resilience.

Comments (0)

Successful and Best Practices

June 29th, 2010 - Arthur (Andy) Felts

Most are probably familiar with the maxims, “He who hesitates is lost,” or “seize the day.” It makes intuitive sense; don’t miss an opportunity. But how are we to reconcile that with “Look before you leap?” It makes intuitive sense as well but is certainly in disagreement with the former. Don’t rush in, take your time.

Such is the state today, I believe, with what are called “best practices.” They have proliferated in many practical areas to the point where you can find many that are in direct contradiction to each other.

As I write this, I have been watching from time to time the suggestions of different people who have thought of ways to clean up the oil spill. Some say spray it with dry ice, some say use pom-poms to soak it up, some say use hay or straw, and some say we should use more and different chemical dispersants while others suggest these may cause even more environmental harm. All may claim to be a best practices currently available, but at some point, they proliferate to the point such that they are just different ways of dealing with a problem or issue and may actually be at odds with each other.

To diverge just a bit, we can say the same about what we call a healthy diet. At one time dieticians and doctors suggested eating a lot of organ meats because they were rich in minerals. Then not, because they are also filters of bad stuff. Margarine was better for us than butter, but then we discovered trans-fats. Though long accepted as fact, there is absolutely no basis in scientific fact that we should drink eight glasses of water a day. Now, we are told there is some evidence that red meat may not be so bad, rather it is cured meats like bacon that cause harm.

Such are best practices—they reflect what we know about the world today in both practice and science. It pushes the point, but at one time the best practice to cure a very feverish patient was to bleed them to rid the body of bad “humors.” Think about that.

As a result of this, as we proceed with the CARRI work of helping communities recovery efficiently, effectively, and fairly from disasters, we changed our terminology to “successful practices” rather than “best.” When we discover policies or programs that have worked in the past we will label them as successful. The admonishment here is clear. Caveat emptor.

This is an admonishment to all that we should think of disaster recovery as a continuously unfolding body of knowledge where what we thought best today may not be tomorrow. Second, and more importantly, we should realize that successful practices are those that have shown results in particular circumstances. Since circumstances can vary—sometimes dramatically—then those who are looking for solutions should consider if their circumstances fit those where a practice was successful.

CARRI has steadfastly maintained that community resilience is created by planning to recover. But once a plan is in place, it should not be put on a shelf someplace and dusted off when a disaster hits. Rather, it should be continuously reviewed and updated to reflect changes in the community and in what we know now rather than then. It also assumes that what we thought was best might not have been that at all.

We may never find the one best way to do something, but we can and should continuously strive to do so—and keep in mind that what we know now are some things that have been successful in other communities. These should be adopted with thorough consideration.

Comments (2)

Of Boiling Frogs, Disasters and Chronic Disasters

June 16th, 2010 - Arthur (Andy) Felts

Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth made a large point of the boiling frog theory. You put a frog in a pot of boiling water and it will jump out. But if you put a frog in a pot of room temperature water and slowly raise the heat, the frog won’t notice the rising temperature. Before long, it will die.

Gore (and others) have used this story to illustrate climate change. Metaphorical, or better, mythically (since it does not appear to be true), I suppose it works. Climate change is analogous to slowly heated water, and we won’t notice until it is too late. Problem is, we already have noticed.

The illustration is, of course, fraught with inconsistencies. First, we have facts relating to boiling water and frogs. Researchers are pretty uniform in saying if you throw a frog in a pot of boiling water, it will jump out if it can or die from the immediate scalding. We can accurately call that an “acute disaster.” So far we agree with Al.

Contrary to popular assumptions, when placed in a pot of water that is slowly heated, the frog will most likely get uncomfortable and jump out. That is best labeled as “chronic disaster”—one that unfolds in slow motion, so to speak. Though in the end, the summative impacts of a chronic disaster may equal those of a major disaster, they just don’t all happen at once.

Climate change (if you believe in it—and I do, by the way) can best be described as a chronic disaster.

I live on a lot that has a salt marsh in the rear—eight feet out my back door. My lot is eight feet above sea level. Over some period of time, I could, I suppose own beachfront property if some sea-level rise predictions are correct and if I am alive. Alternatively, I could have deep-water access and a lot that is (by today’s standards at least) worth considerably more than it is now. I write this because I’ll have ample time to adapt and make any of myriad decisions to deal with rising water.

In thinking about the slow devolutions of chronic disasters, they occur in a way that is much akin to allowing me to make the decision to put up hurricane shutters in the midst of one.

Certainly the CARRI model of disaster and recovery can apply to chronic disasters. But should it and if it should, how? We can think about it, because nothing is pressing.

There are a couple of things we should focus on as we consider this question.

The first is whether or not a chronic disaster is one that suggests a community will be sustainable over time. In this sense, chronic disasters can result in a persistent downward trajectory of community functioning. In the case of climate change and sea level rise, salt water may make incursions into drinking water sources, beaches lost as recreation areas, and so on. In this sense, a community enduring a chronic disaster becomes less and less resilient and might not be able to resist even a minor perturbation as it slips downward.

The second issue is adaptation. Likely many communities will elect to build dikes or begin an incremental retreat from the shoreline as the sea levels rise. This would be akin to introducing a new species to combat a non-native invasive one.

Economic disasters are often chronic. One industry leaves, then another, and then another. Slowly, incrementally, the community’s economy crumbles. However, the warning signs are there in multiple forms. Higher joblessness, declining home values, higher crime and so on are all signs. Think Detroit. At some point, communities may breach the realm of sustainability and become entirely different than what they were, if anything at all. That is why my good colleague, John Plodinec says we need a Common Framework, now! It would allow us to see the oncoming freight train in an objective fashion.

The CARRI model can certainly assist a community in recognizing it is on a downward trajectory. We at CARRI have to decide whether the recovery model we have created “fits” chronic disasters that progressively deplete a community’s resources over an extended period of time. In the case of a community that is unsustainable, thinking out loud again and speaking for myself and not the CARRI team, I do not think it does because adaptation is one thing and unsustainability is another.

Comments (0)

Symbolism and Resilience

June 10th, 2010 - Arthur (Andy) Felts

I’ve been busy of late writing a paper for CARRI that explains our ideas about a Community Recovery System (CRS) and a Common Framework (CF) to wider academic and practitioner audiences. As I have done so, I have once again been struck by what a linear process writing is.

We at CARRI see disaster recovery as following a logic, but one that also shows the interconnectedness of a community. Though post-disaster infrastructure recovery is important early on, even then the gears of a community’s economic and social system are engaging. It is important to understand this because any recovery plan that does not will not be as effective.

As I was struggling with a way of explaining the need to pay attention to social factors, early on I thought about a community’s social capital. Social capital is one form of glue that holds a community together during normal functioning. It literally, to use our CRS and CF terminology, helps create a sense of community. And it gets stressed, stretched, and challenged during and following a disaster.

I went back and searched for a quote I had highlighted in Lawrence J. Vale and Thomas J. Campanella’s edited volume, The Resilient City: How modern cities recover from disaster, written in 2005. There, Vale wrote:

“….[R]ecovery occurs network by network, district by district, not just building by building; it is about reconstructing myriad social relationships embedded in schools, workplaces, childcare arrangements, shops, places of worship, and places of play and recreation.” (Vale, 2005)

My mind immediately seized upon a familiar image—that of the tattered American flag that someone searching amidst the World Trade Center rubble attached to the highest girder sticking in the ground. Even before the first truckload of debris was carted away, putting up a symbol that the city would use to endure its disaster. Who can forget the image of sheer compassion on the fireman’s face as he tenderly carried a young child away from the rubble that had once been the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City? These are the types of symbols that help a community rebuild.

Vale writes about other rituals that matter–the ceremony that was held before the last truck carted the last load of debris from ground zero where the towers once stood. In his words, “Remembrance drives resilience.”

The significance of this should not be overlooked. Even in the early stages of disaster recovery, a community should attend to matters of social capital just as it works to repair roads and bridges. Of course, the primary form this takes is communication from community leaders that clearly understand this is both at stake and an issue.

Social functioning may rest atop adequate infrastructure and a healthy economic system, but that does not make it any less important in the meshing of gears that create community resilience.

Comments (0)

Thinking the Unthinkable

May 12th, 2010 - Arthur (Andy) Felts

Today I am “thinking out loud” as I watch, read, and listen to what is happening on the Gulf Coast – I am really concerned about what is happening there, and I thank you for listening as I share my thoughts and note these are my thoughts and not necessarily those of the CARRI Team. A couple of years ago, Time magazine reporter Amanda Ripley published a book titled The Unthinkable: Who survives when disaster strikes and why. The book recounts individual acts of heroism in response to disasters and what bluntly must be described as incredible acts of naïveté at best and stupidity at worst. It is simplistic, but accurate, to say that those who survive disasters think ahead and those who do not, don’t.

Of course it is human nature to resist thinking about disasters, unthinkable or otherwise. We will never know why some people try to carry their luggage off a burning plane, why someone heads for their attic with no way out during a severe flood or why some thought up was the best way to get out of the burning World Trade Center.

CARRI is about encouraging communities to think about known possible threats that have a reasonable possibility of occurring. Addressing these through mitigation, preparation, response and planning to recover makes common sense.

But CARRI is also encouraging communities to think about the unthinkable where the consequences of a disaster can be dramatic in scale. The way we have been doing this is developing a Common Framework that asks communities to look at events, no matter how remote, where the potential loss is enormous. In doing this, they may decide that at least some preparation or mitigation – however modest – might be appropriate.

If we are to believe what we read these days, the unthinkable has occurred in the Gulf of Mexico. The possibilities of an oil rig exploding, collapsing and sinking one mile into the ocean, and leaving an open, gushing stream of oil were so remote and fail-safed enough we were not to worry.

However it appears a perfect storm of events did occur to make that unthinkable a reality. Given that reality, we now realize that the human/ecosystem damage could be so vast that it might have been worthwhile to construct a simple thing like a containment dome and perhaps even another one or two strategies in advance. I’m not privy to the BP boardroom, but I’m betting that they wish they did, given the costs they are facing in retribution and cleanup.

It is ironic that the unthinkable should have been because twenty-one years ago an oil spill in Alaska coated 1,300 miles of Prince William Sound. It was another perfect storm. A tired Captain turned the ship over to a tired crewman with icebergs in the outer shipping lane, forcing the ship to sail an inner lane. Add to that the technology was not operating that would have alerted the crew to the rocks that the Exxon Valdez encountered.

Ripley writes about this at the individual level. Even though we all know that being a passenger on a crashed plane is extremely remote, those who do survive report that they actually listen to the flight attendant’s instructions and identify the nearest exit. Or those that head to the attic in a flood take an axe with them.

As they become more resilient, communities should move from thinking about the thinkable and the probable to the unthinkable where the loss could be very high.

Comments (0)

How Far We’ve Not Come

April 26th, 2010 - Arthur (Andy) Felts

I teach a Capstone Seminar in the master of public administration program at the College of Charleston—it is designed to bridge the students’ academic experience with the practitioners’ world. One of the assignments for the seminar is for students to work in teams of three or four on a real policy issue/problem. I ask local governments and nonprofits if they have issues or problems and the students choose from the list I get in response.

This semester, one group chose to examine and suggest updates for the City of Charleston’s policy addressing how employees will be expected to perform in the event of a disaster. While some employees, for example, those involved in public safety and health are clearly part of an emergency response plan others are not. Disaster or not, the city’s financial operations cannot shut down, public works crews need to be ready to quickly deploy for emergency repairs to critical infrastructure, and an orderly system of public communication needs to fall in place.

In previous blogs, Dr. John Plodinec and I have hinted at this by suggesting that any recovery plan should factor the critical role that public employees will play. Many employees may be required to work several days straight and then be on-call for an extended period. It is unreasonable for a plan not to acknowledge this and provide assistance to them in meeting family needs. It is unreasonable to expect that an employee will work two or three straight days and not know if their family is safe and secure.

A good plan for public employees would identify ”tiers,” from those that are deemed critical for the ongoing operations of the government, to those that may not be needed for several days. Employees should know in advance what is expected of them in a disaster, what they can expect in return, and, as best they can, make their own personal plans accordingly.

As the students did their research, they naturally decided to contact other East coast communities to see what their employee plans were for disasters.

One community representative, alarmingly, responded they would convene department heads and make a plan if a disaster was imminent. There are two pieces of news here. That is not a plan. Rather it is a plan to plan at what is probably not a very good time. Secondly, and more importantly, they should understand that a disaster is always imminent.

As if that was not enough to set off alarms in my head, the students reported that many communities said they had no plan at all for use of employees during a disaster. The students said they didn’t feel comfortable in asking them ”why not” since they are, after all, still students.

If you are reading this, alarm bells should be ringing loudly in your head as well. Governmental response outside emergency management both during a disaster and in the extended recovery period is crucial. Lack of a plan that employees know and understand will likely not only dramatically affect the time needed to recover, but human lives as well.

Comments (0)

More Thoughts Regarding “Managing for Long-Term Recovery in the Aftermath of a Disaster” – Read it With Us!

April 14th, 2010 - Arthur (Andy) Felts

This is a continuation of last week’s blog on Managing for Long-Term Recovery in the Aftermath of a Disaster, Charles J. Alesch, Lucy A. Arendt, and James N. Holly (Public Entity Research Institute, 2009). This is, as I said, a book I heartily recommend.

The methodology used in the book was qualitative interviewing. They picked several communities that had endured disasters and in varying stages of recovery and simply asked people who were there when the disaster hit, “What happened?”

In listening to people tell their story, the authors gradually arrived at some conclusions put forth in the book. One particularly insightful one was that even as infrastructure was being restored and steps taken toward recovery, the disaster’s effects continued on for several years.

Though undoubtedly communities need some outside support in recovering from major disasters, they note they could find no correlation between the amount of support and how effective the community was at recovering. Some got a lot of support and still appeared to be failing and some not so much and were succeeding.

The last chapters of the book are written from a public practitioner’s perspective. The authors note the incredible strain that disasters put on public workers. Not infrequently, city managers resign after working long days for months on end. This is one more reminder that communities that do not plan to take care of their employees and their families are neglecting a crucial resource.

Recovering from disasters can offer a community an opportunity to undo past mistakes. Many communities tried to do just that in focusing on revitalizing their decaying downtowns as a recovery strategy. Not surprisingly, they didn’t succeed. Even after facades were spiffed up, streets landscaped, and inviting parks built, most in the community continued to prefer the mall on the edge of town.

I am reminded of the many failed efforts that cities undertook to ‘mall-ize’ their downtowns in the 1960s and 70s. Despite spending massive amounts of money and building them, the people did not come.

We at CARRI are always reminding ourselves that the trajectory of a community before a disaster will be exacerbated post-disaster. The point here is a simple one. The decayed, vacant, unappealing downtowns didn’t happen overnight. Their development was an incremental process that occurred building-by-building, street-by-street, and tenant-by-tenant over several years. Attempting to change direction with all of that momentum in the wrong direction is not, as Alesch et. al. observe, good policy.

Restoring, rehabilitating a vacant downtown should be done through careful planning with community involvement and likely will take a long time. While recovery planning can undo some mistakes, it cannot expect to reweave the fabric of the community in a completely new pattern.

Comments (1)

New Publication “Managing for Long-Term Recovery in the Aftermath of a Disaster” – Read it With Us!

April 7th, 2010 - Arthur (Andy) Felts

In my initial relationship with CARRI as the local researcher in Charleston, one of the aspects of disaster recovery was gathering what we called ‘nuggets.’ These were, in our mind, some things that communities did to smooth the path toward ‘getting back to normal.’

An example that comes to mind is that Mayor Riley arranged for utility workers to stay in a vacant hotel (which has since been renovated and is now on the historic register) in Charleston. Rather than having to drive their equipment to a central site, they could leave it where they were working, get on a bus, and come back to a meal and bed. This undoubtedly hastened Charleston’s recovery from Hugo.

An excellent book that contains many ‘nuggets’ has recently been published by the Public Entity Risk Institute (PERI)—Charles J. Alesch, Lucy A. Arendt, and James N. Holly co-authored a book, Managing for Long-Term Recovery in the Aftermath of a Disaster, PERI, 2009. You can find the book at their website: http://www.riskinstitute.org/peri/

The authors are to be praised for taking on the issue of disaster recovery from a holistic perspective and giving a lot of good information in a very readable format. I would encourage any practitioner who has an interest in disaster recovery to read it. This book not only contains many examples of what communities did right in recovering from a disaster, but also others where they made mistakes. All are nuggets making the book a very worthwhile read.

The best parts of the book are in patiently explaining how disasters are really complex socio-economic events. We on the CARRI Team have constantly said that recovery must engage the ‘full fabric’ of the community and that is a different way of saying the same thing.

The book is particularly effective at explaining and categorizing cascading events, the slow unfolding of the consequences of disaster that are often unnoticed and may take years to occur. The authors break out the immediate consequences of disasters and then explain clearly how these can lead to more immediately following consequences and to systemic community consequences that in turn, create ripple reverberations and consequences. They offer excellent, concrete examples of all these, grounding them in their on-the-ground research method that they used in questioning individuals in specific communities on how they endured different disasters.

If all this sounds complicated, it is not—and that I why I recommend the book. One of the things they note, for example, is that sometimes business failures as a result of a disaster may take many more years to occur. The business owner holds on for as long as they can, linked to their communities by a sense of place and community, and simply cannot do it anymore. The success stories they tell are equally as enlightening.

What Alesch et. al, know is that a disaster affects the whole community—recovery is not about any single component—the infrastructure, economy or social aspects.

At this point, what I would invite is for any who are reading this blog to get the book and read it. It is worthwhile. Engage in some commentary and we can begin to exchange our views on it. I have some problems with it, but that is because we are all passionate about disaster recovery. You are welcome to respond to this blog or engage me directly at feltsa@cofc.edu.

Comments (0)